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IV

I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal of a judgment entered by the district court following a bench trial over
rights associated with a driveway easement. The underlying dispute was over the right to use
a driveway easement situated on Pearson' s property and extending onto Lorenzen's property.
Lorenzen is the owner ofresidcntial property located in the Hayden Lake Honeysuckle
Hills Building Sites. Lorenzen owns parcels identified as Kootenai County Tax Parcel No. TN
37, TN 3364, TN 3894, TN 3507, TN 10420, TN 11365, and TN 11366 ("Lorenzen Property").
David and Cynthia Pearson ("Pearson") arc owners of residential property adjacent to the
Lorenzen Property consisting of Kootenai County Tax Parcel No. TN 39, TN 40A, TN 3887,
TN 3513, and TN 9800 ("Pearson Property"). 1 The Lorenzen Property and the Pearson
Property share a common driveway that is located primarily on the Pearson Property ("Shared
Driveway"). The Shared Driveway intersects with East Hayden Lake Road, a/k/a the "lower"
Hayden Lake Road. At the terminus of the Shared Driveway is an oval driveway circling a
large pine tree on the Lorenzen Property (the "Oval Driveway"). The Oval Driveway is situated
in front of the residence on the Lorenzen Property. The residence on the Lorenzen Property is
accessed by both driveways. Exhibit "A" to this brief is an illustrative depiction of the

1

The Lorenzen Property and Pearson Property were once part ofF. Lewis Clark estate, originally
called Honeysuckle Lodge which consisted of over 1400 acres. F. Lewis Clark was a timber and
mining industry magnate until his mysterious disappearance in 1913. R. Tr. Vol I, p. 6-8, L.17-25,
L.1-25.
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Pearson Property, Lorenzen Property, Shared Driveway and Oval Driveway, with TN numbers
indicated for case of reference.
The Pearson Property was previously owned by Roy and Quintilla Williams
("Williams"). In 1976, Williams created an express easement for the Shared Driveway via
warranty deed, recorded as County of Kootenai Instrument No. 724760 ("Warranty Deed No.
724760"). Wananty Deed No. 724760 also conveyed a small portion of what is now the
Lorenzen Property to Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen. The Pearson Property was purchased by
Pearson in 2013 from Williams' successor, Susan Phillips ("Phillips") who had acquired it in
1997 from Cyrus Vaughn ("Vaughn").
Most of the Lorenzen Property was acquired by Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen in 1968
from .Mrs. Johnson. When acquired, the Lorenzen Property had long been accessed by the
Shared Driveway later memorialized in Warranty Deed No. 724760. By 2013, Lewey
Lorenzen had passed away and Phyllis Lorenzen was in a memory care facility. The Lorenzen
Property was owned by a family trust and was leased out to tenants.
After acquiring the Pearson Property, Pearson pressured Lorenzen to abandon the
easement rights over the Pearson Property and construct an alternative driveway to access the
Lorenzen Property from E. Hayden Lake Road. Lorenzen declined. Pearson then installed a
remote controlled gate at the intersection of the Shared Driveway and E. Hayden Lake Road.
In the fall of 2016, the tenants who occupied the Lorenzen Property were blocked by Pearson
and unable to access the Lorenzen Property through the gate. Access through the gate was
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restored only after Lorenzen sought an injunction in November of 2016; however, Pearson
continued to interfere with the use of the Shared Driveway. Pearson parked vehicles on the
Shared Driveway in a manner that prevented Lorenzen 's tenants from driving around the Oval
Driveway and frequently badgered the tenants and Lorenzen about their use of the Shared
Driveway.
At trial, the district court heard testimony from witnesses, including Lorenzen and
Vaughn, relating to the historical use of the Shared and Oval Driveways. Following trial, the
district court found that there is an express casement for the Shared Driveway on the Pearson
Property, and that this casement is appurtenant to the Lorenzen Property. The district court
ruled that the instrument creating the express casement on the Shared Driveway also granted
Pearson the right to use the Oval Driveway on the Lorenzen Property. Pearson appeals these
rulings.
B.

Course of Proceedings

This litigation began with Lorenzen seeking injunctive relief from Pearson's
interference with access to the Lorenzen Property over the Shared Driveway. The Complaint
was filed with the district court on October 14, 2016. R., p. 12-25. It sought a declaratory
judgment concerning the right to use the Shared Driveway for ingress and egress to the
Lorenzen Property and the right to use the Oval Driveway without it being obstructed by
Pearson. Id. A First Amended Complaint was filed by Lorenzen on November 22, 2016. R.,

p. 37-50.
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On November 7, 2016, the district court granted a stipulated Order for a preliminary
injunction which restrained and enjoined both Pearson and Lorenzen from blocking or
otherwise interfering with access to their respective prope1ties via the Shared Driveway. R., p.

34-36. Pearson filed an Answer and Counterclaim on June 27, 2017. This Counterclaim sought
to quiet title in Pearson as against the Lorenzen Property and the heirs, successors and assigns
of Lewey and Phillis Lorenzen from using the Shared Driveway and claimed that Lorenzen
Property's right to use the Oval Driveway did not extend to any portion of it located on the
Pearson Property. R., p. 51-60.
On July 6, 2017, Pearson sought dissolution of the stipulated preliminary injunction on
the grounds that the death of Phyllis E. Lorenzen allegedly altered the facts upon which the
stipulation was entered into hy Pearson. R., p. 68-69. Pearson also sought a preliminary
injunction to restrain Lorenzen and Lorenzen' s agents, tenants, and invitees from further using
the Shared Driveway. Id. Lorenzen filed an Answer to the Counterclaim on July 17, 2017. R.,

p. 70-73.
The district court denied Pearson' s motion for a (new) preliminary injunction on
August 7, 2017. R., p. 84-87. The district court also denied Pearson's motion to dissolve the
November 6, 2016 preliminary injunction and ordered that the original injunction remain in
effect until the district court issued its decision on the merits. Id.
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A hench trial was held on October 17 and 18, 2017. The court issued its Memorandum
Decision and Order following Court Trial ("Memorandum Decision") on February 28, 2018.
R., p. 92-126.
Following issuance of the Memorandum Decision, the paities grappled with how to
properly describe the Shared Driveway and Oval Driveway for incorporation into a final
judgment. R. Tr. Vol. II, p. 3 72, L. 10-16. The district court chose to utilize a metes and bounds
easement description prepared by a licensed land surveyor (Christopher Renaldo) who had
been commissioned by Lorenzen to prepare a survey (Tr. Ex. 13), that was entered into
evidence at trial. R. Tr. Vol. I, p. 426, L. 8-25, p. 427, L. 1-2.
The district court entered Judgment on June 18, 2018. R., p. 127-133. Pearson then filed
a motion for reconsideration of the June 18, 2018 Judgment. R., p. 9. Following the hearing
held on August 28, 2018 on Pearson ' s motion to reconsider, the district court directed that,
since Pearson objected to the metes-and-bounds legal description used in the Judgment,
Lorenzen and Pearson were to each select three licensed land surveyors and agree upon one to
conduct an additional survey of the Shared Driveway and Oval Driveway. R. Tr. Vol. 11, p.
394, L. 19-25; p. 395, L. 1-15. On October 24, 2018, the district court issued an order
compelling the appearance of both Lorenzen and Pearson at a hearing to finalize the Judgment.

R. p. 9-10; R. Tr. Vol II,p. 428, L. 2-15. Atthehcaring held on December 18,2019, the district
court entered an Order denying Pearson's Motion for Reconsideration and a final Judgment
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using the metes and bounds legal description prepared by surveyor Renaldo. R. Tr. Vol II, p.
426, L. 8-17.
An amended final Judgment was entered on January 25, 2019. R., p. 138-144. Pearson
filed a Notice of Appeal on January 14, 2019, and an amended Notice of Appeal on February 8,
2019. R., p. 145-155.

C.

Statement of Facts.

Pearson acquired the Pearson Property in 2013 via a warranty deed from Phillips,
recorded as Kootenai County, Idaho Instrument No. 24259750000. The deed for TN 35IJ2
contains language giving Pearson clear notice that it was being made subject to the "easements,
rights of way and agrecments ... ofrecord." R., p. 108; R. Tr. Vol. TT, p. 17, L. 1-10. Phillips
had acquired the Pearson Property in 1977 from Vaughn, via warranty deed recorded as
Kootenai County Instrument No. 1503711. Trial Ex. 7; R. Ce1t. of Ex., p. 21-24. This deed
stated that the conveyance was made subject to the "[e]asements and [r]ights of way of record
and in view." R. Cert. of Ex., p. 21; R. Tr. Vol. Il, p. 18, L. 18-24.
The Pearson Property and the Lorenzen Property are contiguous, with the Pearson

Property lying immediately west of the Lorenzen Property. R., p. 38. Access to the Lorenzen
Property is by way of the Shared Driveway on the Pearson Property. Id. The Shared Driveway
leads from E. Hayden Lake Road to the Oval Driveway that is mostly situated on the Lorenzen
Property and to a black top area on the Pearson Property. R., p. 99. Williams conveyed the

2

TN 3513 is the parcel of the Pearson Property on which the Shared Driveway is situated.
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Oval Driveway to Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen in 1976. R., p. 95; R. Tr. Vol. I, p. 17, L. 4-14,
p. 50, L. 12-14. Both driveways appear on the plat maps of the area as far hack as 1946. R. , p .
94.
Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen began renting a part of the "Red Barn" residence from
Williams in the mid-sixties. R., p. 95 3; R. Tr. Vol. l, p. 17-18, L. 19-21. The Lorenzens later
rented the entire "Red Barn." R., p. 94-95. Williams and Lewey Lorenzen were business
associates and the Lorenzens and the Williams were good friends. R. Tr. Vol. I, p. 20, L. 7-9.
During this time, Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen also became friends with Mrs. Johnson who
then owned what is now the Lorenzen Property, and from whom Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen
later acquired what is now the Lorenzen Property. R. Tr. Vol. I, p. 18, L. 21-25, p. 20, L. 1-3,

16-19.
Williams granted an express easement for the Shared Driveway in March of 1977, when
he conveyed the Pearson Property to Pearson 's predecessors in interest (Cyrus Vaughn Ill,
Porter and Joeve Wilkinson) via a warranty deed recorded as Kootenai County, Idaho
Instrument No. 1444492 ("Warranty Deed No. 1444492"). R., p. 39. The language Williams
included in Wananty Deed No. 1444492 expressly stated that the conveyance was made
"subject to the right granted to Lewey H. Lorenzen and Phyllis E. Lorenzen, their heirs,

successors and assigns .. . to use for ingress and egress... " of the Shared Driveway. Id.

3

The Red Barn was originally an out building on the Clark Estate. It was converted into a
residence with rental rooms at some point. It is now Pearson's single-family residence. R., p. 8,
L. 7-8.

7

1

From 1968, when the Lorenzen family acquired the Lorenzen Property, until Pearson s
arrival in 2013, the use of the Shared Driveway was never an issue. R. Tr. Vol. I, p. 86, L. 25,

p. 87, L. I; R., p. 39. The adjacent owners shared the driveway since it was the sole means of
vehicular access to both the Lorenzen Property and the Pearson Property. Id. The right to use
the Shared Driveway was not considered to be a right specific to one property owner, rather,
it was thought of as a "community right" since there were no alternative ways to access the
Pearson Property and the Lorenzen Property. 4 R. Tr. Vol. I, p. 86, L. 25, p. 87, L. 1.

At trial, Pearson urged the Shared Driveway easement language be strictly interpreted
as a right personal to Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen only. The district court found that such a
strict interpretation of this language did not make sense under the circumstances in this case.
R., p. 105. However, the deed was determined by the district court to be sufficiently ambiguous

to justify consideration of extrinsic evidence as to the grantor's intent.
The district court's evaluation of the language of the express easement in Warranty
Deed No. 144492, in conjunction with the language of the express easement creating the
Shared Driveway in Wan-anty Deed No. 724760, resulted in the district court's decision that
the express easements in these two deeds could be read together. R., p. 105.

4

Jacobs Ladder Trail is a driveway to neighboring garage owned by Mr. and Mrs. Ken Layman.
R. Tr. Vol. I, p. 268, L. 1-3. Access to the front door of the Lorenzen cabin and garage arc via
the Shared Driveway. Jacobs Ladder Trail does not provide access to the Lorenzen Property.
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The district court also evaluated the testimony of Vaughn and Lorenzen in conjunction
with its interpretation ofWarranty Deed No. 724760 and detennined that the witness testimony
provided by both Vaughn and Lorenzen was "strong evidence" of Williams's intent that the
easement creating the Shared Driveway was appurtenant to the Lorenzen Property and
therefore benefited the heirs, successors and assigns of Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen as did the
right to use the portion of the Oval Driveway located on the Pearson Property. R., p. 107. The
district court found that Warranty Deed No. 724760 from Williams to Vaughn and Vaughn's
heirs, successors and assigns indicated Williams also intended to grant the easement to
Lorenzen and Lorenzcn' s heirs, successors and assigns. R., p. 107.
II.

STAND ARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, "a trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly
erroneous." Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 855, 55 P.3d 304, 309 (2002);
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a). In applying that principle, the appellate court cannot reweigh the evidence, judge the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute their view of the facts
for that of the district court. Argosy Trnst ex rel. v. Wininger, 141 Idaho 570, 572, 114 P.3d
128, 130 (2005). lt is the responsibility of the district court to judge the credibility of witnesses
and weigh conflicting evidence. Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 367, 79 P.3d 723, 726
(2003). The appellate court's role is simply to dete1mine whether there is evidence in the record
that a reasonable trier of fa<.:t could accept and rely upon in making the factual finding that is
challenged on appeal. Miller v. Callear, 140 Idaho 213, 216, 91 P.3d 1117, 1120 (2004).

9

\Vhen an action is tried to a court without a jury, detenninations as to the credibility of
witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, its probative effect and inferences and
conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are all matters within the province of the district court.

Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, lnc., 134 Idaho 738, 9 P.3d 1204 (2000). The district court's
findings of fact will be liberally construed in favor of the judgment entered. Beard v. George,
135 Idaho 685, 23 P.3d 147 (2001). This Court exercises free review over conclusions of law.

Smith v. JB. Parson Co., 127 Idaho 937,941,908 P.2d 1244, 1248 (1996).

HI.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Pearson's appeal focuses in large part on the cou1t's interpretation of the language in
Warranty Deed No. 724760 granting the express easements on the Shared Driveway and Oval
Driveway. Pearson's argument appears to be premised on his subjective belief that the express
easements language in Warranty Deed No. 724760 is susceptible to one, and only one, possible
interpretation. Pearson fails to include any citing references to evidence in the record of the
district court in supp01t of this position. Instead, Pearson supports his arguments largely hy
mischaracte1izing the district court's analysis and conclusions.
Pearson sets f011h six (6) "ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL." They can be
condensed and summarized as the following three: ( 1) as a matter oflaw, a strict interpretation
of Warranty Deed No. 724760's language on the Shared Driveway' s express easement
required that the easement be personal to Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen; (2) as a matter of law,
strict interpretation of Warranty Deed 724 7 60 's language on the express easement on the Oval

10

Driveway shows that any right to use the Oval Driveway portions located on the Pearson
Property no longer exist because they too were personal to Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen only;
and (3) the district court's conclusion that the express easement created by Warranty Deed No.
724760 was appurtenant to the Lorenzen Property and benefited the heirs, successors and
assigns of Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen (including the right of use of the Oval Driveway
portion located on the Pearson Property), was not supported by "substantial and competent
evidence."
Lorenzen believes that the following more accurately set forth the issues on appeal:
A.
Was the district court c01Tect in concluding that the language in Warranty Deed
No. 724760 on the use of the Shared Driveway easement was ambiguous?

B.
Was the district court's interpretation of the language of the express easement
in Warranty Deed No. 724760 supported by substantial and competent evidence?

C.
Was the district court's conclusion that the express easement in Warranty Deed
No. 724760 included the Oval Driveway's use by the Lorenzen Property supported by
substantial and competent evidence?
D.
Was the Judgment entered January 25, 2018, by the district court containing the
metes-and-bounds legal description for the Shared Driveway and Oval Driveway casements
proper?
II
II
II
II

11

ARGUMENT

I.

THE SHARED DRIVEWAY EASEMENT WAS INTENDED TO BE
APPURTENANT TO THE LORENZEN PROPERTY.

A.

The district court's decision that the language of the express easement in
Warranty Deed No. 724760 was ambiguous (as to the intent of grantor
Williams) was supported by substantial and competent evidence.

Intent as to intent is the linchpin of this case. Pearson relics almost entirely on the
argument that strict interpretation of the language in Warranty Deed No. 724760 concerning
the Shared Driveway easement requires that, as a matter of law, the district court's
interpretation of the deed was in error.
This Court and the Court of Appeals have held that "[i]n construing an easement in a
particular case, the instrument granting the easement is to be interpreted in connection with
the intention of the parties, and the circumstances in existence at the time the easement was
granted." Nelson v, Johnson, 106 ldaho 385,387,679 P.2d 662,664 (1984) (citing Quinn v.

Stone, 75 Idaho 243, 270 P.2d 825 (1954)). An evaluation of the parties' intent "must be
determined solely from the deed if the deed is unambiguous." (Emphasis added). Camp Easton

Forever, Inc. v. Inland Northwest Council Boy Scouts ofAmerica, 156 Idaho 893, 899, 332
P.3d 805, 811 (2014). However, if the deed is found to be ambiguous, it is subject to
"interpretation as a matter of fact considering the intent of the parties according to the language
of the deed and the circumstances surrounding the conveyance." Machado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho
212,280 P.3d 715 (2012).

12

Page 13 of the district court's Memorandum Decision states the following: " ... the grant

is ambiguous as a matter oflaw that runs to Grantees Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen and is silent
as to their invitees, their family, repairmen, and delivery persons. It can be read to apply only
to the two Lorenzens, personally, or to other persons necessary to Lorenzen 's enjoyment ofTN
10420." R., p. 104.
Where a deed is ambiguous as a matter oflaw, the court is not hound to strictly interpret

it and may, indeed must, look to extrinsic evidence including the circumstances of the
conveyance.
In addressing the issue of drafter Williams's intent, the district court considered King
v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 42 P.3d 698 (2002). While the district court notes that King contains

similarities in the easements granted, the easements created by Warranty Deed No. 724 760 are
very much distinguishable from those in King. R., p. 104. Unlike King, the district court found
that the language in Warranty Deed No. 724760 creating the easement on the Shared Driveway
was "much more vague" than that in King. R., p. 104; King, 136 Idaho at 908, 42 P.3d at 701.
The language of the easements granted in King were to a "very express and narrow family
group" and "it was clear who the intended beneficiaries of the ... casement were." R., p. 104.
In the present case, the language in Wan-anty Deed No. 724 760's express easement is
not very express and narrow. Whether the easement was only to Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen
or to Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzcn' s invitees, family, repairmen, and delivery people -- is a fair
question to anyone reading the deed. lt does not make sense that Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen

13

would have agreed to an easement over the Shared D1iveway in their personal favor only, since
it is the only access the Lorenzen Property, while at the same time, grant an easement in
perpetuity in favor of the Pearson Property on the Oval Driveway. R., p. 104. Because of this,
the district court found that the language of the easement grant in Warranty Deed No. 724760
was subject to multiple interpretations, i.e., it was ambiguous. R., p. 104~ 105.
One interpretation was that the Shared Driveway casement language should be read to
apply only to Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen personally. Another interpretation is that it should
be read to apply to other persons necessary to Lewey and Phyllis Lorcnzen's enjoyment of the
Lorenzen Property as well as their heirs, successors and assigns. R., p. 104. Pearson advocates
the former of the two interpretations should apply in this case. Pearson's interpretation is
however, totally inconsistent with the use of the Shared Driveway and Oval Dliveway by both
properties' guests, family, delivery agents and tradesmen. The district court did not find this
narrow interpretation to be reasonable in light of the circumstances and instead, was correctly
guided by the presumption set forth in Nelson that "[i]n cases of doubt, Idaho courts presume
that easements [arc] appurtenant." Nelson, 106 Idaho at 387-388, 679 P.2ds at 664-665.
B.

The district court's consideration of the facts and circumstances to
conclude the Shared Driveway easement is appurtenant to the Lorenzen
Property and benefits Lorenzens' heirs, successors and assigns. was
supported by substantial and competent evidence.

Having found that the language in Warranty Deed No. 724760 ambiguous concerning
the Shared Driveway, testimony and other documents of record were considered by the district
court. R., p. 107.
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Nelson v. Johnson states that "in construing an easement, the instrument granting the
easement is to be interpreted in connection with the intention of the parties, and the
circumstances in existence at the time the casement was granted and utilized." Nelson, 106
Idaho at 387, 679 P.2d at 644. Nelson does not however dictate the nature, quantity, quality
or type of evidence to be considered. That decision is properly left to the discretion of the trial
court. Relying on Nelson, the district court considered the testimony of Lorenzen and Vaughn.
Lorenzen provided testimony on the historic use patterns of the Shared Driveway from
the mid-nineteen sixties to the present. Vaughn corroborated this testimony. See, R. Tr. Vol. I,
p. 19-20, infra, R., pp. 99, 107, 108, 120.
In stark contrast to this direct, first-person testimony about the historical use of the
Shared Driveway, Pearson engages in complete speculation. Pearson implies, with utterly no
supporting evidence, that Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen acquired TN 11366 (a parcel paralleling
to the Shared Driveway) as an alternative access route to lower Hayden Lake Road, in stating
that:
"it is hard to believe that an attomey5 who is purchasing TN 3178 would not
inquire or know about plans for TN 11366 when it is adjacent to her property,
has an eastern boundary that is nearer to the dwelling than the fence line as
depicted on Trial Exhibit 13 and obviously provides a physical connection to
llayden Lake Road." (Emphasis added).
Opening Brief., p. 11. When asked at trial why Lewey Lorenzen retained TN 11366, Lorenzen
testified that there was never any discussion or thought of (her) Lorenzen purchasing TN 11366

5

The " attorney" referenced is Lorenzen, the daughter of Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen.
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because her family "used it for parking" for the Lorenzen Property. Emphasis added. R. Tr.
Vol. I, p. 79, L.3-7.
Pearson does not provide any witness testimony, correspondence, notes, construction
plans, or other evidence that Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen acquired TN 11366 to be used as an
altemati vc access. The only thing Pearson provides in support of this theory is that Lorenzen
"never testified that she was aware of the transaction or negotiations or considerations involved
.. ." in the acquisition of TN 11366, Opening Brief, p. 15. This is not evidence. It is the utter
lack of evidence.
The circumstances existing when the Shared Driveway and Oval Driveway easements
were created include the fact that TN 11366 was used for parking. R. Tr. Vol. I., p. 60, L. 1719. Lorenzen testified that TN 113 66 was also "useful for overflow parking." Emphasis
added. R. Tr. Vol. I, p. 79, L. 7. These "circumstances" certainly do not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that the Shared Driveway was intended only for the benefit of Lewey and
Phyllis Lorenzen.
Pearson's Opening Brief at page 18 flatly misrepresents the district court's record
stating that "[n]o contemporaneous person was brought forward as a witness nor other
documentary evidence to shed light on whether the parties intended anything other than what
was plainly expressed in the Deed." Opening Brief, p. 18. This statement completely ignores
testimony of both Lorenzen and Vaughn. Vaughn 's testimony, like that provided by Lorenzen,
related to the historic patterns of use of the Shared Driveway and the Oval Driveway by
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property owners from the time after Warranty Deed No. 724760's creation in 1976, until
Pearson 's purchase in 2013. R., p. 107.

ln weighing the sufliciency of conflicting evidence at the trial level, the trier of fact is
the arbiter of conflicting evidence. Id. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Sun Valley Shamrock Resources v.

Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 794 P.2d 1389 (1990).
In addition to the testimony of Lorenzen and Vaughn, other evidence in the record
illuminated the facts in existence at the time the easement conveyance was made. The district
court consi dercd a warranty deed identified as Kootenai County Instrument No. 1444492
("Wairanty Deed No. 1444492"). Consideration was given to this Deed since it was not only
drafted by the same party (Williams), but it also postdates Warranty Deed No. 724760 by a
mere five (5) months. R. , p. 110. The district court noted Warranty Deed No. 1444492
contained the language included within the 1976 Deed, but also expressly included "the heirs,
successors and assigns" of the Lorenzen Property. Id.
Following its review of Warranty Deed No. 1444492 in conjunction with Warranty
Deed No. 724760, the district court found Wan-anty Deed No. 1444492 to be " substantial and
competent evidence" of grantor Williams 's intent that the earlier casement be appurtenant to
the Lorenzen Property and benefitting the heiI"s, successors and assigns of Lewey and Phyllis

Lorenzen.

II
II
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II.

THE EXPRESS EASEMENT CREATED IN WARRANTY DEED
NO. 724760 FOR THE SHARED DRIVEWAY INCLUDES THE
OVAL DRIVEWAY, INCLUDING PORTIONS SITUATED ON
THE PEARSON PROPERTY.
A.

The district court's approach to interpreting Warranty Deed No.
724760 was supported by substantial and competent evidence.

Since the comt detennined that the language in Warranty Deed No. 724760 granting
an easement on the Shared Driveway and the Oval Driveway was ambiguous, testimony from
Vaughn and Lorenzen concerning historical use was proper for consideration by the court.
The testimony provided by Lorenzen described the history of use of the Oval Driveway
since well before Pearson purchased the Pearson Property in 2013. R. Tr. Vol. I, p. 13, L. 1425; p. 14-17, L. l-25. Both before and after the acquisition of TN 10420 by Lorenzen, the
Shared Driveway was used for access to the TN 10420 and TN 3507 properties. R., p. 107; R.
Tr. Vol. l, p. 24, L. 9-25. Lorenzen used the entire Oval Driveway including the northern exit
from the Oval Driveway onto the Shared D1iveway, as did the prior owners, including Mrs.
Johnson 6• R. Tr. Vol. I, p. 68 L. 24- p. 70 L. 11, p. 70 L. 4-11; R., p. I 6. Lorenzen had always
used the Oval Driveway before 2013, when Pearson purchased the Pearson Property. R. Tr.
Vol. I, p. 25, L. 2; R., p. 16. Lorenzen also testified of having observed the use of the Shared
Driveway by former property owner, Mrs. Johnson, between the mid-1960's and 1976, which

6

The district court mistakenly refers to "Mrs. Phillips" instead of "Mrs. Johnson" on page 16 (R.
p. 107) of the Memorandum Decision. Mrs. Phillips was not a prior owner of the Lorenzen
Property.
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included using the Shared Driveway as access to parking on Lorenzen's TN 11366 property.

R. Tr. Vol. I, p. 60. L. 15" 19; R., p. 16.
Vaughn testified to the use of the Shared Driveway from 1976 until 2013. R., p. 107.
The district court called this testimony "evidence of the long standing and unbroken history of
the use of the casement before Pearson bought it in 2013." R. , p. 107. During the time
Vaughn's family owned and occupied the Pearson Property, beginning in 1977, there were
never disputes over the use of the Shared Driveway or the Oval Driveway. R., p. I 07; R. Tr.
Vol. 1, p. 30, L.1-25.
Vaughn testified that the Shared Driveway was used by the Vaughns and Lorenzcns hy
coming onto it from Hayden Lake Road. R., p. l 08; R. Tr. Vol. I, p. 82, L. 23-25. Like
Lorenzen, Vaughn also testified that there had been no issues over the Lorenzen Property's
use of the Shared Driveway or the Oval Driveway. R. Tr. Vol. T, p. 88, L. 12-15; R., p. 108.
In Vauglm 's view, the Lorenzen Property "had the right to use" the Shared Driveway and the
Oval Driveway. R., p. 108; R. Tr. Vol.

r, p.

87, L. 22-25, p. 88, L. 1.

Prior to Pearson's purchase of the Pearson Property from Vaughn's successor
(Phillips), Pearson reviewed a title commitment and discussed it with his attorney. R., p. 108;
R. Tr. Vol. II, p. 18, L. 18-24. He was aware of Special Exception No. 11 to the title
commitment which identified the easement to the Lorenzen Property in Warranty Deed No.
724760 and excepted it from coverage. R., p. 108; R. Tr. Vol. TI, p. 255, L. 8-14; R. Tr. Ex.
11, p. 4; R. Cert. of Ex., p. 35-41. Tn Akers v. D.L. White Construction, Inc., 142 ldaho 293,
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301, 12 7 P .2d 196, 204 (2005 ), this corni ruled that "a person who purchases propetiy
expressly subject to an casement with notice, actual or constructive that the property was
burdened with an easement takes subject to the easement." Further, Pearson knew before he
bought the Pearson property that the Shared Driveway was the only access to the Lorenzen
Property simply by viewing the property. It could not have been more obvious.
B.

The Oval Driveway benefits and burdens the Pearson Property as
well as the Lorenzen Property.

The district court reviewed the blown-up detail in the upper left corner of Trial Exhibit
No. 13, which was a survey dated December 29, 2016 by Renaldo Land Surveying. R. Tr. Ex.
13; R. Cert. Ex, p. 43. The survey's detail in the upper left corner depicting most of the Oval
Driveway as a backward letter "C" shape on the Lorenzen Property, was discussed as follows:

" .. .reference to the upper left portion of Exhibit 27 and Exhibit 28 shows the
oval driveway to be an oval, not a back:i,vards C Those three exhibits show
historically the western portion of the oval driveway, a frontward C, to be
located on what became TN 3 513 and TN 9800 belonging to Defendants. This
evidence convinces the court that Plaintiff's interpretation of the easement to
use Defendants' driveway was intended by the Williams to include the right to
use that portion of the oval driveway located on TN 3513 and TN 9800 for
ingress and egress from TN 10420."
(Emphasis added). R., p. 108.
Not only was the district cou1i satisfied that Lorenzen 's interpretation was correct, it
also found that to be consistent with the testimony about the use of the Shared Driveway and
the Oval Driveway from the mid- l 960s until 1976 when an easement grant was first described
in the deed to Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen. R., p. 109.
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Pearson claims the Shared Driveway easement only allows the Lorenzen Property to
use the southernmost point access to the Oval Driveway. R. Tr. Vol. 11, p. 257 L. 16-23 and
p. 260, L.6 - p. 267, L. 22; R. p., 109. However, the district court disagreed and noted that if

"one completes the oval driveway as Lhe court has concluded the Williams intended and
consistent with the use prior to 1976, then access to the southwesterly corner of TN 10420
gives the Lorenzen Property access to the entire Oval Driveway," (R., p. 109). This was found
by the district court to be" ... the only interpretation that makes any sense under the totality of
the evidence." id. This evidence is without a doubt, substantial and competent and must not be
disregarded here on appeal merely because Pearson disagrees with it.

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S USE OF THE METES AND BOUNDS
LEGAL DESCRITION IN THE JUDGMENT WAS PROPER.

Page seven (7) of Pearson' s Opening Brief contains challenges described as errors of
law which arc, in reality, challenges to the district court's fact finding. Notably, the Opening
Brief docs not comply with I.AR. 35 regarding the way issues are to be argued on appeal.
Rule 35 (a)(6) requires that an appellant's opening brief "contain the contentions of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to
the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon." (Emphasis added).
This Court has "has repeatedly stated that [it] will not consider an issue not supported hy
argument and authority in the opening brief." Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372, 234 P.3d 696,

698 (2010).
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The last issue challenged by Pearson in this appeal relates to the sufficiency of the
metes-and-bounds legal description used in the Judgment entered by the district comi on
January 25, 2019. Pearson argues that:
"No evidence of a metes and bounds description for the location of the easement
was offered or admitted into evidence during the trial of the case. Subsequent to
the issuance of the decision of the trial court the plaintiff caused a metes and
bounds description to be produced by the engineer that produced Trial Exhibit
13 which showed the driveway as it now exists ... the trial court decided to
abandon the stipulation and second engineer' s work in favor of continuing with
the description initially provided by Lorenzen' s engineer. "
Opening Brief, p. 19. First, Pearson s argument does not include any cited authority, statutes,
or parts of the transcript or record relied on for support as required by I.A.R. 35(a)(6). Opening
Brief, p. 19. This includes Pearson s statement that the "stipulation" and "second engineer's
work" was i,abandoned" by the district court. Opening Brief, p. 19.
The Court in Liponis has "repeatedly stated it will not consider an issue that is not
suppmied by argument and authority in the opening brief." Liponis, 149 Idaho at 372,234 P.3d
at 698 (2010). Pursuant to Liponis and the Idaho Appellate Rules, this fifth issue challenged
by Pearson should not be considered by this Court.
If for some reason this Court decides to consider it, the district court's Judgment entered
on January 25, 2019, must still be upheld. The Court recognizes that, at the trial level, the
district court, as the trier of fact, has province to weighing conflicting evidence. Sun Valley

Shamrock Resources v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 794 P.2d 1389 (1990). In
doing so, the district court's decision will be "liberally construed in favor of the judgment
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entered and the findings and conclusions which are based on substantial, although conflicting
evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal." Sun Valley Shamrock Resources, 118 Idaho at 116,
794 P.2d at 1389.
Evidence is considered to be substantial" when a reasonable trier of fact would accept
it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact had been proven." First State

Bank of Eldorado v. Rowe, 142 Idaho 608, 130 P.3d 1146 (2006); citing Williamson v. City of
McCall, 135 Idaho 452, 454, 19 P.3d 766, 769 (2001)); Id R Civ P 52(a).
The district court's hearing on Pearson s Motion for Reconsideration held
December 28 , 2019, clearly laid out the reasons it wouldn't consider further argument by
Pearson on the metes and bounds legal description issue.

The district court states the

following:

"Okay. Let the Court ... take a moment and explain the Court's position a little
further with regard to the C portion of the oval driveway. I described it as not a
backwards C but an oval. And there is a historical pattern of use there that
predates [Pearson's} ...purchase of that property by many years. With respect
to the use of the C portion, which is located on [Pearson's} property, that use
is limited to the minimum amount necessary to effect the historical use, which is
to allow the reasonable ingress and egress through the western portion of that
oval driveway, which goes back to the original plat in the '20s or the '40s, as I
recall. The exact extent of that in terms of width is not in evidence. I don't
think it needs to be. " (Emphasis added)
R. Tr. Vol. II, p. 425, L. 1-16.
Further, the district court explained it was not going to pursue further survey as urged
by Pearson. It explained that it had done so initially because it "wanted to have position from

the parties with respect to what they believed was necessary and to honor Mr. Covington 's
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clients' objection to the form of the judgment and the description of the legal boundmy." R.

Tr. Vol. 11, p. 426, L.12-17.
Pearson had ample opportunity to offer his own metes-and-bounds legal description or
otherwise articulate why the description in the Judgment was deficient. Pearson failed to do
so. This was not appreciated by the district comt, as evidenced by the following colloquy with
Pearson' s counsel at the December 18, 2018 hearing:
" ...And one thing this Court doesn 't appreciate is your unavailability. I've tried
and tried to get the clerk to contact your office to set hearings, to bring things
forth, and we get nothing. And the reason this hearing was set today is because
,ve tried and tried and tried to get ahold ofyour office.for available dates. There
was no answer."

R. Tr. Vol. II., p. 428, L. 2-8.
Pearson had both the right and the opportunity to inform the district court on why they
felt the legal description of the easement was inappropriate. Pearson waived that right and the
district court entered judgment accordingly. Pearson cannot ask this Court to relieve him of
the consequences of his own inaction.

IV.

LORENZEN IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
ON APPEAL.

A

Lorenzen should be awarded her costs on appeal pursuant to ldaho
Code§ 12-107 and/or I.AR. 40.

"As to costs on appeal, as a matter of course, costs are awarded as to the prevailing
party under ldaho Code Section 12-107 and Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a)." Big Wood Ranch,

LLC v. Wafer Users' Association of the Broadford Slough, 345 P.3d 1015, 1023, 158 ldaho

24

225,233 (Idaho 2015); citing Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 148
Idaho 479, 50 I, 224 P.3d 1068, 1090 (2009).
B.

Lorenzen should be awarded her attorney's fees on appeal.

Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 4l(a), Lorenzen asserts a claim to attorney 's fees on
appeal. However, that Appellate Rule "does not provide authority to award attorney fees," so
Lorenzen prays this Court "permit a later claim for attorney's fees under such conditions as it
deems appropriate." I.A.R. 4l(a). Bagley v. Thomason, 241 P.3d 972,978, 149 Idaho 799,805
(Idaho 2010); citing Swanson v. Krqft, Inc., 116 Idaho 315, 322, 775 P.2d 629, 636 (1989).
"An award of attorney fees will be made if an appeal does no more than simply invite
the appellate court to second-guess a trial court on conflicting evidence, or if the law is well
settled and the appellant has made no substantial showing that the lower court misapplied the
law, or -- on review of discretionary decisions -- no cogent challenge is presented with regard
to the trial judge's exercise of discretion." Pass v. Kenny, 118 Idaho 445, 797 P.2d 153 (Ct.
App. 1990); LA.R. 41.
Pearson was the non-prevailing party at trial. Of that, there is no doubt. Because
Pearson ' s arguments presented in appeal are opaque and certainly not supported by substantial
and competent evidence cited in the Opening Brief and because Pearson's appeal simply
invites this Comito second guess the district court, Lorenzen must be the prevailing party and
he awarded her attorney's fees.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Respondent Shelley Lorenzen respectfully requests that
this Honorable Court affirm the district court ' s findings of fact and conclusions of law and
enter an award of attorney's fees and costs.
DATED this 5th day of August, 2019.
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & HARRIS, LLP
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